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INTRODUCTION

AJOINT VENTURE is broadly defined as an association of
Z1individuals or companies jointly undertaking a commercial
enterprise for mutual profit and under shared risk. Like other
potentially anticompetitive activities, joint ventures are subject
* Candidate for J.D./M.B.A., 2000, Southern Methodist University School of
Law and Cox School of Business; B.A. Economics, Emory University, 1996. Following graduation, the author will join the firm of Winstead, Sechrest & Minick,
P.C. in Dallas, Texas.
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to the restrictions of both the Sherman Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is . . .illegal."1 Section 5 of the FTC Act declares unlawful any "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce."2
Some experts posit that harsh antitrust laws prevent the formation of joint ventures in the areas of research and development (R&D) and production.3 This may be the reason why the
United States is at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. The National Cooperative Research and Production
Act of 1993 (NCRPA)4 purports to ease the standards by which
these types of joint ventures are judged. But is this softening
sufficient to level the playing field and propel the United States
back to the forefront of the global economy? And is there even
a problem with the status quo regarding American technological innovation?
This Comment will analyze the current treatment ofjoint ventures generally. More specifically, it will discuss American treatment of joint R&D and production ventures and the standards
used to judge their formation and existence. In addition, the
Comment contemplates proposals to alter the current treatment
of these joint ventures and includes a discussion of several other
possible reasons for America's falling behind in the global race
for innovation. Finally, this Comment will argue that since
there is actually no problem with American technological innovation, a modification of our antitrust laws is not necessary.

1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
2 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1994).
3 See Thomas M. Jorde & David J.Teece, Innovation, Cooperationand Antitrust, 4
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (1989). But seeJoel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform forJoint Production Ventures, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 253, 261 (1990) (stating that antitrust laws are
"remarkably flexible," and do not represent a barrier to consortia formation).
4 See National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 10342, § 2(b), 107 Stat. 117 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306
(1994)).
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II. JOINT VENTURE STANDARDS

Courts have realized that virtually every agreement between
business entities "restrains" trade in a sense.5 Therefore, courts
and federal enforcement agencies, including the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), inter-

pret the statutes to only prohibit contracts that are "unreasonably" restrictive of competition.6 Under what is known as the

"rule of reason," the anticompetitive effects of an agreement in

restraint of trade are balanced against its procompetitive bene-

fits to determine whether a joint venture unlawfully restrains
trade.7 Also, certain types of agreements are deemed per se illegal such that no procompetitive justifications will save them
from a violation of the antitrust laws.8
The courts recognize that joint ventures that involve a true
integration of their members' resources might generate substan-

tial efficiencies and should therefore be evaluated under the
rule of reason.9 Thus, while prior to the NCRPA no bright line
rule appeared to exist, if the joint venture did not appear on its
face to restrain trade, it was not deemed per se illegal.1"
In contrast, in Maricopa County the Supreme Court struck
down as per se illegal a price fixing agreement among compet-

ing medical doctors that created a fee schedule for services pro5 See United States v. Topco Assoc. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972); Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
6 See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988);
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911).
7 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 53-57 (1977);
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 343; Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
8 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Topco Assoc.,
Inc., 405 U.S. at 607.
9 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1979); Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
10 See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113 (stating that per se treatment is inappropriate if "a joint selling agreement [makes] possible 'a new product by reaping
otherwise unattainable efficiencies'") (quoting Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. at 365 (Powell,J., dissenting)); BroadcastMusic, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20-24 (showing how blanket licenses permitting licensees to perform any and all musical
compositions of the licensing agencies' members did not simply act as a restraint
of trade and, therefore, "should be subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason"); Association of Indep. Television Stations v. College Football Ass'n, 637 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (holding that an
intercollegiate football association acting as joint venture could not be condemned as per se unlawful because cooperation may "foster [ production and
efficiency").
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vided under health plans." In reaching this conclusion, the
Court noted the absence of any integrative efficiencies that reof a simple price fixing agreement among
sulted in its finding
1 2
competitors.
The threshold issue with respect to a joint venture involving
actual or potential competitors is whether it involves a sufficient
integration of the economic resources of the parties to escape
condemnation as a per se unlawful cartel arrangement. 3 If a
joint venture actually involves the integration of the parties' productive assets in a manner that "hold[s] the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and enabling it to compete more
effectively," 4 the Supreme Court has held that it should be evaluated under the rule of reason.
For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, the Supreme
Court determined that the rule of reason was appropriate because the blanket license was "not a 'naked restrain[t] of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition,' but rather accompanie[d] the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use."' 5 The Court decided
that the rule of reason was appropriate because the venture offered substantial efficiencies that were potentially beneficial to
both sellers and buyers 6
Numerous other cases illustrate the Supreme Court's approach toward drawing the line between per se unlawful cartel
activity and legitimate joint ventures subject to review under the
rule of reason. For instance, in U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., an exclusive dealing arrangement warranted rule of
reason treatment because it was not a horizontal agreement "devoid of joint venture efficiencies."' 7 In Addamax Corp. v. Open
Software Found., Inc., the court held that "[i]f. ..the joint venture is based on a lawful attempt to integrate resources, the
agreement is measured according to the standard 'rule of reason' analysis.""8
11 See Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 356-57.
12 See id. at 356.

See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68
(1984); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53-57 (1977).
14 Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 768.
15 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963)).
16 See id. at 22-24.
17 986 F.2d 589, 594 (lst Cir. 1993).
18 888 F. Supp. 274, 281 (D. Mass. 1995); see also National Bancard Corp. v.
VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 599 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that "BM!'s underly13
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An arrangement qualifies for rule of reason analysis as a joint
venture only when it involves some potential for an efficiencygenerating integration of the parties' resources. When the alleged efficiencies are illusory, the characterization of an agreement as a 'joint venture" will not save it from per se illegality.
Courts have found so-called joint venture arrangements per se
unlawful where there was no meaningful integration and the arrangement merely served as a device to fix prices or allocate
customers. 19
Competitors may characterize the sharing of information or
resources as part of a "strategic alliance" or 'joint venture" in an
effort to take advantage of any perceived leniencies in antitrust
law toward joint ventures. But, once again, the mere labeling of
an arrangement as a 'joint venture" will not legitimize an otherwise illegal agreement between competitors to suppress competition.2 0 An arrangement violates the Sherman Act when it is
anticompetitive, regardless of the name of such an
21
arrangement.
The courts look at several factors when determining if the
rule of reason should apply:
22
1. Potential for economies of scale;
2. Non-exclusivity-an arrangement in which the participants
are not restricted from selling separately outside the venture.25
A joint venture with ancillary agreements that prevent the paring teaching therefore appears to be that courts should look to whether the restraint at issue [in the joint venture] potentially could create an efficiency
enhancing integration to which the restraint is ancillary"), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
923 (1986); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814
F.2d 358, 370-71 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that "there [must] be some productive
cooperation as a condition of the application of the Rule of Reason [sic] ....
").
19 See, e.g., Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
1979) (holding that "[t ] he talisman of 'joint venture' cannot save an agreement
otherwise inherently illegal"), adhered to per curiam on reh'g, Engine Specialties,
Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd. 615 F.2d 575 (1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 and Moran
v. Gould Corp. 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
20 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (holding that joint
ventures are not immune from antitrust scrutiny).
21 See Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 602 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d.
Cir. 1979) (noting that a "Section 1 conspiracy will arise . ..where in addition
to ...[a new distribution system a] manufacturer attempts to exact some collateral anticompetitive advantage"); see also Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 256 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1958).
22 See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1985).
23 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (stating that the
artists remained free to license their individual works outside the licensing orga-
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ticipants from engaging in any number of activities may be
struck down as per se illegal;
3. The creation of a previously unavailable product-this is
most obviously the case where the integration of the parties' resources enables them to market a product that the members in
their individual capacities could not;24 and
4. Expansion of output/production-the parties can show
that the arrangement, while eliminating competition among the
members, provides efficiencies in distribution, advertising, or
other marketing-related activities that enable them to compete
more effectively and thereby expand their aggregate output. 2
A 'Joint venture" is not saved from per se illegality where
there is no meaningful procompetitive benefit to be gained as a
result of the venture, but rather the arrangement is merely a
vehicle through which the parties engage in price fixing or allocation of territories or customers. 26 However, in Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the Court noted that arrangements that "hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency
and enabling it to compete more effectively... [will be] judged
27
under the rule of reason.
nizations); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 332, 355 (1982)
(citing Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 22).
24 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 278 (1978) (stating that "some activities can only be carried out jointly.
Perhaps the leading example is league sports. When a league of professional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal
on the ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams."); see also
Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 22 (noting that the blanket license was to some
extent, a different product from what the artists could offer individually); NCAA,
468 U.S. at 101 (recognizing that the horizontal restraint on competition was
essential to make the product, college football, available at all); Association of
Indep. Television Stations v. College Football Ass'n, 637 F. Supp. 1289, 1297-98
(W.D. Okla. 1986) (showing how summary judgment for plaintiffs is denied
where association of college football teams permitted "the packaging and sale of
an otherwise impossible national series of games").
25 See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (applying rule of reason to sports league,
noting that "Broadcast Music squarely holds that a joint selling arrangement may
be so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate output and thus be procompetitive." The NCAA's television plan was nevertheless found to violate the Sherman Act under a rule of reason analysis because it directly restrained output and
did not serve any legitimate procompetitive purpose); Broadcast Music, Inc., 441
U.S. at 18-23.
26 See COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov't, 594 F. Supp. 1567 (M.D. Tenn. 1984)
(holding that a joint venture that represented conspiracy to divide markets and
to interfere with bidding structure for public contracts was per se illegal).
27 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (dictum).
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Therefore, rule of reason treatment of mostjoint ventures will
be granted if the arrangement is not a cloak for what is simply a
naked price fixing arrangement, territorial allocation, or other
form of per se illegal conduct.
III.

TYPES OF JOINT VENTURES

Ostensibly, the most anticompetitive type of joint venture is a
joint sales venture-one in which the venture serves as a joint
sales agent for the participants. For example, a joint selling arrangement, also termed a joint marketing venture, provides an
obvious mechanism whereby competitors may fix prices or output or allocate customers. 2 This risk is more salient when the
joint sales arrangement is exclusive, thereby barring the members of the venture from selling individually outside the venture.2 9 There is also an increased risk of trade restraint if
pricing and output decisions are made centrally through the
joint sales organization." In these circumstances, and in the absence of real integration and substantial efficiencies, the courts
hold that exclusive joint marketing agreements among competitors are per se unlawful. 1
Joint sales ventures raise more serious antitrust concerns than
do R&D or production joint ventures-the reason they are subject to heightened scrutiny. The NCRPA provides for more lenient treatment of R&D and production joint ventures. 2 Joint
marketing and sales ventures are excluded from the scope of the
NCRPA-one indication that they will continue to be viewed
with some skepticism.
Other types of joint ventures, and those that are the focus of
this comment, include R&D arrangements and joint production
ventures. Joint R&D ventures lead to efficiencies and benefits
that would otherwise not be available without such cooperation.
For instance, the risks of a large R&D project may be too large
for one firm to undertake. But these economic risks become
manageable when they are shared among the members of the
joint venture. Indeed, in many industries where there are nu28 See Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 256 F.2d 538,
540-41 (4th Cir. 1958); COMPACT, 594 F. Supp. at 1576-77.
29 See COMPACT, 594 F. Supp. at 1576-77.
SO See id.
31 See, e.g., United States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 182 F. Supp. 834,
860-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc., 256 F.2d at 540-41; COMPACT, 594 F. Supp. at 1576-77.
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2) (1994).
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merous participants each with only a small market share, innovation may only be possible through the joint effort of the all of
firms.
Production joint ventures involve the participants pooling
their resources such that the production of a new or existing
product is manufactured more efficiently. This enables each
member of the venture to distribute the costs and risks of a project. Such an integration of effort allows the creation of new
production facilities or a new product that would otherwise not
be available.
Both R&D and production joint ventures can lead to economies of scale and scope and allow all participants of the venture
to take advantage of shared skills, capital, resources, and knowledge. This encourages firms to invest in new technology and
products and eliminates the duplication of effort that occurs
without such ventures. These joint ventures advance industrial
economies, enhance economic growth, increase consumer welfare, and lead to innovation that might not otherwise occur.
The sharing of risk allows participants to produce a product
without the fear that competitors will subsequently produce the
same product at a much lower cost. Further, the sharing of resources allows the bridging of a gap that may be necessary for
the production of a new product. In these situations, cooperation among competitors leads to advances in technology and
productivity that propel the growth of the American economy.
This may ultimately lead to more product availability as well as
lower consumer prices.
Ancillary restraints are those that affect competition among
venture participants or between the joint venture and its members.13 They can include membership rules, restrictions on
competition between the venture and its participants or between the participants themselves, pricing or output restraints,
and territorial or customer allocation. These restraints will be
upheld only if they are "reasonably necessary" to accomplish the
legitimate purpose of the venture. 3 4 The parties' purpose for
the venture determines whether an ancillary restraint is permitted-those that are broader than required to fulfill such a pur33 See M. Laurence Popofsky & Thomas P. Brown, Production Distribution-The
Special Problem ofJoint Ventures, in 38TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION

& MARKETING at 505, 518 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook

Series No. B-1096, 1999).
34 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 234, 236-38
(1899); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569-71 (1898).
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pose will be voided.15 Unfortunately, just what is reasonably
required to carry out the purpose of the venture is a purely subjective determination that is made by the courts on an ad hoc
basis since this standard cannot be quantified by the Act.
Many cases in which a joint venture has been challenged as an
unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman Act have involved these various collateral restraints rather than a challenge
to the joint venture itself.36 Again, if such collateral agreements
are ancillary to the joint venture's legitimate business objectives,
they will typically be evaluated under the rule of reason. 7
An agreement among the participants in a joint venture not
to compete with the joint venture in the relevant market in
which the joint venture operates is likely to be upheld as such a
restraint is often viewed as necessary to secure the participants'
commitment to the venture. 8 However, an agreement among
the joint venture participants not to compete in markets separate from the joint venture market is generally impermissible.3 9
IV.

NCRA40 OF '84 AND THE NCRPA OF '93

Some pundits believe that the antitrust laws have contributed
to the economic decline of the United States. Economists
Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School and Scott Stern
of MIT found that even though American firms have led in innovation in the past, by the year 2005 the United States will trail
most countries. 4 1 This includes countries such as Japan, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.4 2 Congress acknowledged the perceived view that the "antitrust laws may have been mistakenly
perceived as inhibiting cooperative innovation arrangements
that promote competition" and that "clarification of the law
35 See Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 570-71; NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 103-04 (1984).
36 SeeAddamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir.
1998); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 296-97 (1985).
37 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. C.B.S., 441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. 472 U.S. at 295-96.
8 See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir.
1985). The result may differ if the elimination of the venturers from the market
will leave the joint venture with significant market power.
39 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
40 See infra note 47.
41 SeeJohn Carey, R&D Blues: U.S. Innovation Ain't What it Used to Be, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 22, 1999, at 6.
42 See id.
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would serve a useful purpose."43 Indeed, the stated purpose of
the '93 Act is "to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and
strengthen the competitiveness of the United States in world
markets by clarifying the applicability of the rule of reason standard and establishing a procedure under which" joint ventures
are to be judged.44 Even President Clinton asserted that the
time has come to level the playing field for American companies. In assessing the problem, President Clinton stated that
"[i] t is altogether appropriate to lift the legal barriers that prevent good companies from playing to win in the global market-provided, of course, our antitrust laws continue to prevent
improper collusion. Now is the time ... to strip away outdated
45
impediments to our growth and potential."

The growth and competitiveness of American companies ostensibly have been stifled in the past because the antitrust laws
invited the competitors of a joint venture to file suit with the
possible reward of treble damages. The threat of litigation and
treatment as a per se illegal arrangement was bridling American
progress.4 6 The proponents of the original National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 4 7 among others, believed that without
the threat of per se illegality American firms would have an incentive to combine their talent, knowledge, and money for joint
R&D. The protection was augmented by the NCRPA as joint
production ventures were added to the Act's safe harbor and
treble damages were limited in some circumstances.
A. JOINT VENTURE DEFINED

1. Included in Definition
Since joint ventures "defy ... neat classification and precise
definition and . . . well established rules for evaluating their
43National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42,
(a) (3), 107 Stat. 117 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306

§2

(1994)).
44Id. § 2 (b).
45S. Rep. No. 103-51, at 10 (1993) (citing White House Press Release, Mar. 11,
1993).
46 See Thomas A. Hemphill, U.S. Technology Policy, Intraindusty Joint Ventures,
and the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 32 Bus. ECON. 4,
Oct. 1, 1997; National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, § 4,
98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988)).
47 See National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat.
1815.
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competitive impact [do not exist] ,"48 the NCRPA is particularly
helpful as it delineates specifically what falls within the ambit of
its protection by redefining 'Joint venture." The Act purports to
confine its protection to those joint ventures engaged in R&D
and production only:
(6) [t]he term "joint venture" means any group of activities, including attempting to make, making, or performing a contract, by two or more persons for the purpose of(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic
study of phenomena or observable facts,
(B) the development or testing of basic engineering
techniques,
(C) he extension of investigative findings or theory of a scientific or technical nature into practical application for
experimental and demonstration purposes, including
the experimental production and testing of models,
prototypes, equipment, materials, and processes,
(D) the production of a product, process, or service,
(E) the testing in connection with the production of a product, process, or service by such venture,
(F) the collection, exchange, and analysis of research reproduction information, or
(G) any combination of the purposes specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F) and may include
the establishment and operation of facilities for the
conducting of such venture, the conducting of such
venture on a protected and proprietary basis, and the
prosecuting of applications for patents and the granting
of licenses for the results of such venture, but does not
include any activity specified in subsection (b) of this
section.49

2. Excluded from Definition
So precise is the new law, that it also lists those activities that
are not entitled to the Act's protection and remain subject to
treble damages and per se illegality. Therefore, if section
4301 (a) (6) seems too broad, section (b) specifically eliminates a
number of practices from the Act's protection:
48 See COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov't, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1574 (M.D. Tenn.
1984).
9 National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42,
§ 3(c)(5), 107 Stat. 117 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (a) (6)
(1994)).
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(b) The term 'joint venture" excludes the following activities involving two or more persons:
(1) exchanging information among competitors relating to
costs, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution of any product, process, or service if such information is not reasonably required to carry out the purpose
of such venture,
(2) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct restricting, requiring, or otherwise involving
the marketing, distribution, or provision by any person
who is a party to such venture of any product, process,
or service, other than(A) the distribution among the parties to such venture,
in accordance with such venture, of a product, process, or service produced by such venture,
(B) the marketing of proprietary information, such as
patents and trade secrets, developed through such
venture formed under a written agreement entered
into before the date of the enactment of the National Cooperative Production Amendments of
1993, or
(C) the licensing, conveying, or transferring of intellectual property, such as patents and trade secrets, developed through such venture formed under a
written agreement entered into on or after the date
of the enactment of the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993,
(3) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct(A) to restrict or require the sale, licensing, or sharing
of inventions, developments, products, processes,
or services not developed through, or produced by,
such venture, or
(B) to restrict or require participation by any person
who is a party to such venture in other research and
development activities,
that is not reasonably required to prevent misappropriation of proprietary information contributed by any person who is a party to such venture or of the results of
such venture,
(4) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct allocating a market with a competitor,
(5) exchanging information among competitors relating to
production (other than production by such venture) of
a product, process, or service if such information is not
reasonably required to carry out the purpose of such
venture,
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(6) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct restricting, requiring, or otherwise involving
the production (other than the production by such venture) of a product, process, or service,
(7) using existing facilities for the production of a product,
process, or service by such venture unless such use involves the production of a new product or technology,
and
(8) except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (6), entering into any agreement or engaging in any other conduct to restrict or require participation by any person
who is a party to such venture, in any unilateral or joint
activity that is not reasonably required to carry out the

purpose of such venture.5 °
B.

BENEFITS OF

NCRPA

PROTECTION

The Act provides two coveted protections for potential joint
ventures. It provides for rule of reason treatment and limits
damages for those ventures that qualify.
1.

Rule of Reason Protection

Section 4302 of the Act provides certainty for joint ventures
that fall within its definition of protected arrangements:
the conduct of any person in making or performing a contract to
carry out ajoint venture shall not be deemed illegal per se; such
conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness, taking
into account all relevant factors affecting competition, including,
but not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined,
relevant 5research, development, product, process, and service
markets. '
Note that the Act does not provide antitrust immunity to
these joint ventures. Nor does it change the legal standards
used to determine if a joint venture violates the rule of reason.
Instead, the Act simply prescribes thatjoint ventures that adhere
to the Act's mandates and fall within its definition of an R&D or
production joint venture will be rewarded with rule of reason
treatment.
50

Id. § 3(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)).
§ 4302 (1994).

5115 U.S.C.
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2. Limitation of Damages
Prior to the 1993 amendments to the old Act, joint ventures
were subject to treble damages if their actions violated antitrust
law. The 1993 Act limits this monetary exposure to actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees.5 2 But in order to receive
this protection joint ventures must comply with certain
requirements:
1) An agent of the joint venture must file notice with the Attorney General and the FTC disclosing:
b) The natures and objective of the venture, and
53
c) An update of any change in the venture's membership.
2) The plaintiffs claim must result from "conduct that is within
the scope of [the] notification that has been filed under section 4305(a) [supra] .... ."'
The rules do not end here. There are more stringent requirements imposed on production joint ventures. To benefit from
the limitation of damages provision, a joint production venture
must locate its principal production facilities in the United
States or its territories.5 5 Additionally, each member of the venture must be a United States citizen or a citizen of a country that
provides no less favorable antitrust treatment to United States
citizens than it does to its own.56 The legislative history is clear
that the foreign law to which the Act refers is not merely its antitrust laws, but "all international agreements and other binding
obligations to which that country and the United States are
parties.

57

V.

IS THE NCPRA TOO LENIENT?

One view is that the Act grants complete immunity to any venture that can be characterized as an R&D or production joint
venture.
Indeed, some go as far as to say that the new Act
actually invites cartelism.59
From this standpoint it is merely the characterization of the
venture that entitles it to the lenient standards of the Act. For
52 See id. § 4303.

53See id. § 4305(a).
54 Id.§ 4303(a)(1).
55 See id. § 4306(l).
56 See id. § 4306(2).
57 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-94, at 20 (1993).
58 SeeJohn A. Maher, National Cooperative ProductionAmendments of 1993: Limited
Cartelism Invited, 12 DwcL J. INT'L L. 195 (1994).
-9See id. at 195.
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instance, facilities must only be used for the production of a
"new product or technology" in order to fall within the Act's

safe haven:6'
if a joint venturer's capital contribution is an existing plant for
use in service of the venture, care must be exerted to insure [sic]
that the plant is shifted to a "new product or technology." Alas,
"new product or technology" is not a defined term of art ....
Does a dramatically improved
production floor lay-out constitute
61
a "new ...technology?"

Following this view, enterprises fearing potential antitrust
scrutiny must only comply with certain minimum standards. It
seems that such subterfuge may be accomplished by doing any
one of the following:
1. assigning significantly "new" tasks or utilize "new" technology
in the production facilities of any venture;
2. forming the venture with an eye towards upgraded services
or products; or
3. merging with another entity such that the facilities are used
for "new" products.6 2

In this vein, nothing in the Act requires that the qualifying
venture be a legal entity distinct from the participants themselves. 63 Nor is a venture disqualified from favorable treatment
by reference to ownership percentages. As such, a commonly
owned entity with 99% ownership by one and a mere percentage by another "seems technically adequate to achieve the
NCRPA 'rule of reason standard.. . . "64 Should we read the
Act's silence on this point to mean that a 99% non-qualifying
entity coupled with a 1% qualifying entity eludes per se illegality? Indeed, such equity legerdemain can lead to the following
scenario:

[I]n the capital-intensive context, enterprises uncomfortable
with substantive partners can limit partners to relative silence as
investors in minute percentages ofjoint production ventures but

nonetheless achieve full antitrust-minimizing benefits of [the]
NCRPA. It is even possible to argue that commonly-controlled
affiliates can joint venture to elude various antitrust norms.65
See 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(7) (1994).
Maher, supra note 58, at 201.
62 Id. at 202.
63 See Maher, supra note 58, at 195, 202.
- See id.
65 Id. at 198.
6

61
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Section 4306(1) requires that a venture locate its principal
production facilities in the United States to qualify for the damages limitation. But this does not require that the venture be
headquartered in or otherwise tied to the United States. It is
left to speculation how "principal" is defined and what distinguishes such facilities from incidental facilities.66 Skeptics would
ask if a venture qualified for rule of reason treatment if only one
of multiple production facilities was located in the United
States. This is even more troublesome when one considers that
most enterprises have many facilities that may be wholly or partially independent. 67 How much, if any, of a partially owned
subsidiary must be located in the United States?
There is an additional qualification imposed on members of
the venture who are not American citizens. For these members,
section 4306(2) requires that to qualify for the treble damages
shield, the member's country must provide "antitrust treatment
no less favorable to United States persons than to that country's
domestic persons." 68 Are we to believe that this standard can
adequately be determined by a federal judge hearing an antitrust case? While the DOJ has stated that the existence of a
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, or similar agreement meets this standard, it seems such a requirement is too
subjective to be exacting on a foreign member.69 Concomitant
to such subjectivity is that ventures can argue their case without
immediate fear of per se illegality, thus opening the door to
abuse. Such uncertainty might lead one to believe that in addition to situating its "incidental" facilities outside the United
States, a venture avails itself of the Act's protection if its country's antitrust laws ostensibly provide beneficial treatment to
United States persons.
Those believing that the Act actually invites anticompetitive
behavior are quick to point out that joint venturers can take advantage of the Act's ambiguity.7" None of the following terms is
defined in the Act's definition section: 71 phenomena; observable fact; basic engineering technique; scientific or technical nature; model; process; production; product; service; etc. ..
- See
See
68 See
69 See
1993)).
70 See
71 See
67

id. at 203.
id.
Maher, supra note 58, at 195, 207.
id. at 207-08 (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice Press Release 93-177 (June 28,
Maher, supra note 58, at 209.
15 U.S.C § 4301 (1994).
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Thus, it seems that just about any "combination of purposes "72
in which a venture might want to engage is subject to only a
qualified exclusion of activities as provided for in section
4301 (b).11 Such ambiguity and uncertainty allow potential ventures to proceed with a venture that should not otherwise fall
within the Act's protective scope.
As one example of the breadth of the protected activities,
note the scope of section 4301 (a) (6) (F). The inclusion of "the
collection, exchange, and analysis of research or production information" in the Act's safe haven is much too liberal. It seems
to "include studies of not only [sic] customer preferences and
procurement data, but also other factors of minimal, if any, particular scientific or production significance albeit susceptible of
scientific collection and measurement techniques[.] Where to
stop?"74 Section 4301 (b) fortunately excludes certain actions
that ostensibly fall within the Act's protected purposes. But it
still leaves something to be desired regarding its certainty.
This section contains several unconditional exclusions from
the protection of the Act. 75 As one example, however, Congress

clearly intended not to put a blanket exclusion on the exchange
of data. 76 The Act does not impose any restrictions on the sharing of data between partners or between the venture to its investors. In light of the allowable exchange of data such that
ventures can make sound economic and commercial decisions,
at what point does prohibition effect the exchange of data for
purely anticompetitive reasons? 77 Can venturers not simply
cloak any data exchange such that it seems to fall within the
ambit of the protection? This is merely one example of the potential abuse. Since other limiting exclusions are not unconditional, it follows that Congress intentionally left room to
maneuver or it would have unconditionally excluded numerous
other activities.78
VI.

NOT SOFT ENOUGH

Others view the Act as mere window dressing and point out
that nothing has changed. Between 1984 and 1990, the DOJ
73

See id. § 4301(a) (6) (G); see Maher, supra note 58, at 211.
See Maher, supra note 58, at 210.

74

Id.

75

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(4) (1994).
See Maher, supra note 58, at 212.
See id. at 195, 212-213.
See id.

72

76

77
78

1274

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN

COMMERCE

and FTC challenged a total of only seven production joint ventures. 79 Historically, the courts, the DOJ, and the FIC alike
have accorded very hospitable treatment to both R&D and production joint ventures. Thus, section 4302 merely requires the
courts to apply a standard in evaluating qualified ventures that
they have already been applying for some time.
Ostensibly, there is a standard by which joint ventures know
they will be judged. However, Thomas Piraino has criticized the
courts' inability to develop a "unified theory" by which cooperative arrangements among competitors will be viewed.8" Piraino
outlines the historical approach the courts have taken in their
analysis of joint ventures:8 1
In 1979, in Broadcast Music, Inc.,8 2 the Supreme Court used
the rule of reason to analyze a group of composers' license fee
arrangement. Several years later, the Northwest Wholesaler73 and
NCAA84 Courts also used the rule of reason. However, in
neither of these cases did the Court explain how to apply the
rule of reason analysis and the circumstances in which it should
be used. Recent cases, however, have seen the Court apply a per
se approach to joint ventures (e.g., Arigona Maricopa County Medical Society85 and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 6 ).
Piraino posits that the courts have begun to look past the
traditional approaches to viewing joint ventures and are synthesizing a new approach.87 The next section of this paper addresses the possibility of Piraino's new unified approach that
purports to lend certainty to the standard by which joint ventures are judged.
The case law provides joint venturers with the comfort of
knowing that the rule of reason will generally be applied to
those joint ventures with the potential for creating procompeti79 See Donald K. Stockdale, Jr., Antitrust and InternationalCompetitiveness: Is Encouraging ProductionJoint Ventures Worth the Cost?, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 269, 294
(1992).
8o See Thomas A. Piraino,Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation:A New Antitrust Standard forJoint Ventures, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 871 (1994).
81 See id. at 889-90.
82 See supra note 9.
83 See supra note 22.
84 See supra note 6.

See id.
86 476 U.S. 447, 466 (1989).
87 See Piraino, supra note 80, at 874.
85
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tive efficiencies.8 8 But the rule of reason also carries with it a
significant amount of uncertainty:
i. The courts have typically spoken only in general terms regarding the factors they consider in rule of reason analysis;
ii. The use of "less restrictive alternative"8" analysis raises the
concern that courts might second-guess the judgments
made by the venturers regarding the processes by which the
venture would achieve efficiencies; and
iii. There has been little guidance from the Supreme Court on
exactly how the courts are supposed to "balance" anticompetitive harms against the procompetitive efficiencies of a
venture. 0
In fact, there is no hard and fast set of criteria to which one
may point for a venture to pass muster under the rule of reason.9 1 The "weighing" by the courts of anticompetitive and beneficial effects of a joint venture under the rule of reason "tends
to be more theoretical than real. '9 2 Some believe that, in reality, the courts simply "tend to find benefits (or efficiencies)
where they see no harmful potential and to reject claimed benefits or efficiencies where they find anticompetitive potential." 93
Backing into such results does not lend itself to any amount of
certainty.
The Act does little to prevent competitors from building a
legal barrier to proposed ventures; damages provisions notwithstanding, the Act merely provides more lenient treatment to
ventures and does not exempt them from liability. And, as
noted, the more lenient standard in the form of the rule of reason treatment is subject to different interpretations. Where is
the certainty? Does the Act actually lend itself to the predictability by which joint ventures will be judged? Such uncertainty will
do little to encourage the formation of joint ventures in the
United States-the purported goal of the Act.
Additionally, the Act's definition omits ancillary agreements. 4
Thus, it is likely that cooperative behavior attendant to a joint
88

See supra notes 6-28 and accompanying text.

See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993); Bhan v.
NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
89

90

See Alan H. Blankenheimer, Structuring, Negotiating & Implementing Strategic

Alliances 1998, 1063 PLI/CoR, 453, 460-63 (1998).
91 SeeJorde & Teece, supra note 3, at 40-49.
92 See Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Considerations in Innovation-Driven Markets, 21

CAN.-U.S.L.J. 115, 124.
93 Id.

9- See 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1994).
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venture runs the risk of being deemed per se illegal. If this is
the case, then the joint venture itself runs the same risk. Courts
can easily circumvent the proscribed rule of reason treatment by
finding any ancillary agreements in violation of antitrust laws.
The NCPRA does little to protect joint ventures from this result.
While the new Act still leaves something to be desired, it is an
improvement over the judicial treatment that joint ventures received prior to its enactment. Prior to the Act, ventures were
judged pursuant to case law that granted a broad license to
judges in the adoption of a standard of review.
VII.

PROPOSALS FOR JOINT VENTURE TREATMENT
A.

PIRAINO

Thomas Piraino proposes a method by which joint ventures
can be analyzed that is compatible with case law:
[I]nstead of the piecemeal approach taken to date, the federal
courts need to adopt a unified method of analyzing all cooperative ventures among competitors. Until the courts are able to
devise a general theory that reconciles the advantages of competition and cooperation, American firms will continue to be deterred from entering into efficiency-enhancing joint ventures.95
The apparent contradiction in the method by which the
courts have recently analyzed joint ventures can be reconciled
by looking at the degree to which the parties integrated their
operations.

96

Piraino's method posits that courts should focus on the extent
to which the parties have combined their resources to accomplish their objective.97 The greater degree to which the firms
integrate, the greater is the potential for anticompetitive effects.
Piraino concedes that some integration of capital, resources,
and information is necessary to result in economies of scale,
elimination of duplication, and risk reduction. 8 But he notes
that the fulcrum upon which the competitive and anticompetitive effects of a joint venture rest is naturally the level of
integration. 9 9

The level of analysis given to a joint venture depends on the
level of integration. In its simplest form, Piraino suggests that
95 Piraino, supra note 80, at 880.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 895-96.
98 See id. at 896.
99 See id.
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minimal inquiry is needed for unintegrated joint ventures, while
integrated arrangements require a more detailed balancing.
Since unintegrated ventures (read: cartels) are organized in simple forms that make their competitive and anticompetitive
forms rather salient, a detailed inquiry is not necessary as the
illegality should be obvious.100 But ventures that are fully integrated are more complex such that their competitive effects may
be somewhat obscured. 1 1 This requires a more detailed balancing of the potential benefits with the anticompetitive effects of
the joint venture.10 2 The amount ofjudicial analysis should thus
increase with the level of integration of the venture. This rela03
tionship is depicted in the graph below:1
Degree of Necessary Inquiry

Conduct, Purpose

Conduct Alone
Determinative

Conduct Plus
Purpose Considered

and nd
Market Power
er
Considered

No Integration
(Cartels)

Partial Integration
(True Joint Venture)

Complete Integration
(Mergers)

Amount of Integration
Piraino does an excellent job of translating his graphical relationship into a coherent model that can be followed by the
courts. The most anticompetitive arrangement is a completely
unintegrated venture. These require the least amount of judicial scrutiny because they do not combine the parties' operations, resources, or skill in any manner. The result is a naked
price fixing agreement or other type of cartel. Because their
only result is the
stifling of competition, they should be deemed
4
per se illegal.'
100

0

See id. at 897.

10, See Piraino, supra note 80, at 899.
102

See id. at 897.

103 Reproduced from id.
104

See id. at 898.
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Ventures with partially integrated resources require an increased amount of inquiry because they actually have the potential to increase efficiencies. Both R&D and production ventures
fall within this category. These may result in benefits to competitors, yet they do not eliminate competition like a true
merger.1 "5 As such, the venture's competitive purpose should
be considered:
[I]f the venture proposes to "achieve an efficiency [that] they
could not have reached on their own, such as the creation of a
new product or entry into a new market, courts should uphold

the venture without any further balancing of its efficiencies and
anticompetitive effects.... If, however, the parties intend to use

a joint venture to enhance their efficiency in markets in which
they already operate, the venture will have certain adverse effects....

[C] ompetition that formerly existed among the part-

ners will be eliminated. In such a case the courts should balance
such anticompetitive effects against the efficiencies that the ven10 6
ture is likely to generate.
Finally, the greatest amount of inquiry is necessary when the
arrangement results in a complete integration of the parties resources (read: merger). 0 7 Since all competition between the

parties will be eliminated, courts must consider the parties' market power as well as their anticompetitive effects. Courts should
determine the share of the relevant market and then balance
the anticompetitive effects with the potential efficiencies of the
venture. l 8
Unfortunately, or fortunately for those who believe that a picture is worth a thousand words, this translation results in yet another graph. Piraino's inquiry instructions may be shown in
tabular form:0 9

105
106
107

See id. at 898-99.
Id. at 898-899.
See Piraino, supra note 80, at 899.

108See id.

109 Reproduced from id. at 897.
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Partial Integration

Type of
Venture

No
Integration

Amount of
Judicial
Analysis

Conduct Only

New
Product

Existing
Market

Conduct
+
Purpose

Conduct
+
Purpose

Full
Integration

Conduct
+
Purpose

+

+

Balancing

Balancing
+

Market
Analysis

Piraino claims that courts would not have much trouble in
placing joint ventures along his continuum."0 While this is debatable, at least it would provide some amount of certainty for
potential joint venturers. Naked price fixing agreements are
easily identified. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, for
instance, the Supreme Court held that simply attaching a 'joint
venture" appellation to an agreement among competitors will
not save it from condemnation as a per se unlawful agreement
in restraint of trade where the only purpose and effect of the
agreement is to suppress competition. 1 ' Likewise, mergers are
easily identified by their complete integration of all resources
112
such that any previous rivalry ceases.
Joint venture purgatory obviously lies in the middle of the
spectrum. It is here in Piraino's analysis that any previous
amount of uncertainty is simply replaced by uncertainty in a different costume. Piraino claims that, at a minimum, to qualify as
a partially integrated venture, arrangements should include
joint functions that were "previously performed separately by
the parties."' "13 While distinguishing a bona fide joint venture
from a cartel or merger is readily done, once done it is difficult
to both determine the purpose of the venture and balance its
effects.
Yet this is exactly what Piraino claims will simplify the inquiry
into the legality ofjoint ventures producing new products. This
"should be determined on the basis of the parties' competitive
110See id. at 899.
111 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
112

See Piraino, supra note 80, at 899.

113See id. at 902.
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purpose, rather than by a full market-based analysis."' 14 While
this may be easier to apply, it is by no means any more clear.
Any venture can fabricate a purpose that purports to be valid.
Indeed, "purpose" is too malleable a concept to be determinative of a venture's legality. A purpose can easily be palliated to
look like an efficiency enhancing endeavor-yet Piraino claims
that his "purpose-based standard effectively reveals the future
competitive effects" of a venture. 1 5 While this purpose based
standard simplifies the inquiry, it runs into problems
nonetheless.
Joint ventures in existing markets restrict competition as well
as produce efficiencies. For these types of ventures, simply considering the purpose is insufficient-the courts must balance
the benefits of the venture with the potential anticompetitive
effects.1 16 This balancing that Piraino proposes is a curious restatement of the rule of reason as it has been stated in myriad
cases. "' 7 Has Piraino not simply reinvented the wheel? His
method does nothing to simplify the current analysis of joint
ventures as it seemingly restates the garden variety rule of reason with which we are all familiar.
B.

JORDE AND TEECE'

18

Thomas Jorde and David Teece are preeminent scholars in
the area of antitrust law and economics. 19 Their proposal to
alter the treatment of R&D and production joint ventures has
spawned the introduction of legislation.1 20 Because they believe
that " [c] urrent U.S. antitrust law needlessly inhibits strategic alliances designed to develop and commercialize new technology,"'12 1 their proposal is modeled after the more lenient
antitrust laws of both Europe and Japan. The proposal could
also be implemented by the judicial system without legislation.
Their proposal seeks the following changes:
114 Id.
115 See

at 908.
id. at 910.

116See id. at 915-16.
117 See Piraino, supra note 80, at 880.

118 See supra notes 6-28 and accompanying text.
119 Thomas M. Jorde is a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley. David J. Teece is a professor at the Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
120 Legislation was introduced by Congressmen Rick Boucher (VA) and Tom
Campbell (CA) in 1987-legislation based on their proposal has yet to be passed,
however.
121Jorde & Teece, supra note 3, at 36.
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1. The adoption of a market-based safe harbor exempting ventures that involve less than 20-25% of the relevant market;
2. Altering the definition of the "market" in the context of innovation such that firms with "know-how" are included;
3. A clarification of the rule of reason;
4. Ending the partiality towards full mergers as opposed to contractual integrations or alliances; and
5. Limitation of damages to equitable relief only and attorney's
2
fees.

12

The proposal exempts qualifying joint ventures from all antitrust laws for a period of up to seventeen years. 12 1 Such ventures
might be immune from repercussions for their harmful conduct
as an injured plaintiff would have to receive permission from the
Secretary of Commerce to institute proceedings against the venture.1 24 A venture is not even subject to heightened scrutiny in
order to receive such protection.
Indeed, the DOJ or FTC would have merely ninety days in
12 5
which to conduct a study in order to grant an exemption.
This is odd since the proposal is based on the European model
in which investigations have taken more than three years on several occasions. 12 6 A venture earns an exemption if it does not
have substantial market power in some relevant market. Substantial market power means more than 20-25% of the market.
Alternatively, substantial market power can be shown if the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 12 7 is greater than 1800 and in128
creases by more than 50 as a result of the agreement.
If the market power test seems reasonable, then the test for
"relevant market" is just the opposite as it "includ[es] those
firms presently competing and those who possess the potential
and incentive to compete. [Admittedly, t]hese markets will almost always be global.' 1 29 Firms with the know-how include
non-producers that could sell the product and firms that could
See id. at 61-62.
See id. at 104.
124 See id. at 102-03.
125 See id.
126 See Dana W. Hayter, Scapegoat for the Trade Deficit: Does EEC Antitrust Treatment of Joint Ventures Place the United States at a Competitive Disadvantage?,16 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 391, 403 (1993).
127 The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is a measure of the concentration of the number and size of competitors in any given market. It is calculated
by summing the squares of the market share of each participant.
1s SeeJorde & Teece, supra note 3, at 63.
129 Id. at 65.
122

123
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offer a new product through production alterations. Basically,
the "relevant market" is so broad that any firm in the world that
might someday possibly produce the product is included. This
could not be defined any more liberally. It is somewhat ironic
that the European counterpart thatJorde and Teece seek to emulate requires that a venture demonstrate economies of scale
before being entitled to an exemption.
Nonexempt ventures are subject to a revamped rule of reason
that makes a plaintiff's prima facie case extremely difficult. The
defendant venture may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by
showing 1) a lack of market power; 2) the existence of the potential for competition; 3) benefits
to the consumer; or 4) effi1
ciencies created by cooperation.

30

Messrs. Jorde and Teece propose amendments to the current
antitrust laws that would make it all but impossible for a plaintiff
to challenge most cooperative agreements that might otherwise
be found in violation of the Sherman Act. While their proposal
is based on the system found in Europe and Japan, it provides
far greater protection than what is available overseas. In fact, it
is contrary to the antitrust laws in both Europe and Japan. Despite Messrs. Jorde and Teece's claim that "cooperative innovation arrangements [would] remain subject to the antitrust
laws,"1 31 their proposal creates a safe haven with more loopholes
than the federal evidentiary hearsay rule.
VIII.

IS THERE ACTUALLY A PROBLEM?

By no means is it a foregone conclusion that the United States
does not lead the world in the development of new technologies. While some claim America's dominance in the global competition for innovation has vanished, there is no hard evidence
pointing to this conclusion. From a purely economic point of
view, R&D in the United States is second to none.
The law of supply and demand holds that only good products
will survive in the marketplace. Excess demand will inflate the
price of successful products, while poor products suffer the opposite fate. Foreign investors may be viewed as customers of
American R&D-their investments in U.S. based R&D increased
from $700 million in 1987 to more than $17 billion in 1995.132
130 See id. at

67-68.

131 See id. at 88.
132 See Richard Florida,

at 29-30.

Other Countries'Money, 101 TECH. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1998,
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Foreign companies employ more than 100,000 Americans in
R&D activities worldwide. 133 Clearly, this only occurs because
foreign corporations wish to "gain access to cutting-edge scientists and engineers, and take advantage
of the world's most crea1 34
tive and productive R&D climate."

Assuming arguendo that the United States has fallen behind
other global powerhouses, such as Japan and England, there are
several possible reasons for the decline. One reason is that
American companies are dissuaded from forming joint R&D
and production ventures because of the harsh antitrust laws.
The NCRPA has successfully relaxed the antitrust treatment
of R&D and production joint ventures. The prescribed rule of
reason treatment has eliminated a qualifying venture's fear of
per se illegality. Additionally, the elimination of treble damages
will encourage the formation of cooperative ventures in the area
of innovation. In that vein, however, "[t]here is no evidence
that the.., decline in the competitiveness of American business
can be traced to the antitrust laws.

' 135

Until it has been shown

beyond doubt that an even more lenient treatment of joint ventures will propel the United States to the forefront of the technical revolution, there need be no further changes in the law.
Further, Piraino does nothing to ameliorate the uncertaintythus, no more firms will contemplate joint ventures under his
policy than do under the status quo. While he has successfully
identified a problem with the uncertainty of the laws, he does
not propose an adequate solution. Similarly, while Jorde and
Teece may solve some measure of uncertainty, they create another problem as they invite anticompetitive behavior.
Before solving a problem without an identifiable cause, however, one should consider the numerous other possible reasons
for America's supposed R&D decline. The most glaring possibility is simply that the federal government has cut its funding for
R&D and production endeavors. For instance, prior to 1980,
the federal government was responsible for over 50% of R&D
funding in the areas of computers and telecommunications.
Since that time, that percentage has fallen to just over 30%. l s6
See id. at 30.
Id.
135 Eisen, supranote 3, at 258; see a/soJoseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Law and Innovation Cooperation,4J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 100 (1990) (noting that "[a] ctual antitrust
enforcement has not significantly prevented innovation collaboration").
136 See Using R&D To Drive Growth, INDUSTRY WK., Mar. 15, 1999, at 5, available
in 1999 WL 9567464.
133

134
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At the same time, however, foreign governments have increased
their own funding for R&D. 137 American firms should not be
expected to compete with foreign companies when the playing
field is no longer level.
Accompanying the increase in foreign investment in R&D in
their own countries is an increase in foreign based investment in
American R&D efforts. As stated earlier, foreign entities are
simply buying our technology. American companies must often
agree to share technology or grant a license in return for foreign capital. 138 "Critics argue that [foreign owned laboratories]
are merely skeleton research operations designed to monitor
the American research scene-even pirate ideas developed
here. 139 One estimate claims that foreign firms now account
for one out of every five dollars spent in corporate R&D in the
United states. 4 ° As one example, Japan invests three to four
times the amount in the United States than it does in Asia each
year.'
This view supports the idea that American R&D efforts
are world class-it is simply the results that end up elsewhere.
Thus, the claim that foreigners are pirating American R&D and
ideas is not without merit.
In addition to any claims that our fall from the lead in the
innovation race can be blamed on monetary considerations,
there are several potential non-monetary reasons. The first of
these is that American companies focus on the wrong type of
research.4 2 The focus of American R&D efforts and that of the
Japanese are just the opposite. American firms spend two thirds
of their budget on basic scientific research as opposed to process technology.1 43 In contrast, the Japanese invest approxi137 See Technology Grant Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of
Gov't Management and the District of Columbia of the Senate Gov 't Affairs Comm. [hereinafter Good] (June 3, 1997) (statement of Dr. Mary Lowe Good, Under Secretary
for Technology), availablein 1997 WL 11233307. For example, the Japanese government will have doubled its science and technology budget for the five years
ended 2000. See id.
138 SeeJack Robertson, Yields on Joint Ventures, ELECTRONIC NEWS, July 27, 1992,
at 11, available in LEXIS, All Sources News, LAC No. 12440354.
139 Florida, supra note 132, at 30.
140 See Good, supra note 137, at 4.
141 See Toshihiko Kinoshita, U.S.-Japan-Asia:The Realities Behind the Trade Picture,
4 ASIA PAC. ECON. REV. 2-3 (July 1, 1996), available in 1996 WL 11650302.
142 See generally, M. Caravatti, Why the U.S. Must Do More Process R&D, 35 REs.

TECH. MGMT.

8 (Sept.-Oct. 1992).

See Steven C. Earl, The Need for an American IndustrialPolicy, 1993 BYU L.
REv. 765, 784 (1993).
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mately 70% of their R&D in process technology.14 4 The result of
this apparent disproportionate amount spent by Americans on
product technology is our recent slide in the global market. Disproportionate amounts of R&D spent on product technology
are costly because the market demands that companies place
less emphasis on scientific breakthroughs and more on design,
14 5
process and production technology, and systems engineering.
Yet another purported reason for America's recent lack of
success is our poor industrial and technology policy. Since we
strive to compete in the global market, we must have an industrial policy that is on par with those of the nations against whom
we compete. The most notable countries with superior industrial and technology policies are those of Europe and Japan.
"Europe's Airbus Industrie is one example of how foreign industrial policies have hurt American competitors. This four-nation
aircraft consortium [France, Germany, Spain, and the U.K.] 'has
badly bruised McDonnell-Douglas and has become Boeing's
main challenger thanks to an estimated $20 billion in aid from
European governments.'"146 Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry states that its mission is "to advance the wellbeing of the Japanese people through rapid economic
growth.'1 47 This is a charge it seeks to accomplish by placing its
industrial structure "in accordance with world markets and competitive forces driven by advancing technology.' 148 America's
lacking industrial/technological policy is seen as such a problem that without adequate measures "we will not only cease to
establish the frontiers of knowledge, but we will be so far behind
we won't even be players anymore.
All of the aforementioned "causes" for America's poor recent
innovation efforts seem to point to everyone but the companies
engaged in these efforts. Do American businesses have clean
hands? Maybe not. One view is that "the blame can certainly be
laid on the complacency and inefficiency of American" firms.' 0
Yet others claim that American companies have simply lost sight
144 See Lewis M. Branscomb, Does America Need a Technology Policy?, HARv. Bus.

REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 24, 25.
145 See id. at 24-25.
146 Earl, supra note 143, at 768 (quoting Steven Greenhouse, The Calls for an
IndustrialPolicy Grow Louder, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, § 3, at 5).

147Id.
148

Id.

at 767.

149 Id. at 768 (quoting Dr. Allen Bromley, former science advisor to President
Bush).
150 See Earl, supra note 143, at 765.
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of the forest for the trees. "[M]uch of American industry is
abandoning basic research and frontier technology development in favor of near-term R&D to support product development."'5 1 This occurs because American firms are concerned
with competition-both domestic and global. Strategic R&D
152
decisions are "simply being made out of economic necessity.
American firms have chosen to sacrifice long term growth for
near term success-firm managers are simply looking out for
their own interest. Since their performance is judged on an annual basis, they have no incentive to worry about the future. As
such, their decisions naturally have a short term focus-unfortunately R&D and production technology suffers as a result.
IX.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A modification of America's antitrust laws and treatment of
joint ventures is not needed to cure America's purported lack of
innovation. A better solution might be a clarification of the rule
of reason. The NCRPA provides an adequate safe haven for prospective ventures. Some argue that it is the concomitant uncertainty that dissuades cooperative agreements, not the antitrust
laws per se. But any clarification of the rule of reason must not
come at the expense of extracting the teeth of the antitrust laws.
However, one might point out that it is precisely the uncertainty of the rule of reason that encourages the formation of
joint R&D and production ventures. The courts are saddled
with the same uncertainty with which businesses are faced.
Thus, a more appropriate term for "uncertainty" might be "flexibility." The flexibility of the antitrust laws therefore encourage
the formation of joint ventures.15 3 A clarification of the rule of
reason that set hard and fast criteria would dissuade the formation of joint ventures that might otherwise have been created
under the flexible status quo.
Several factors to which I have alluded earlier, which are seen
to discourage joint venture formation, may now be seen as ad5
ding flexibility to encourage the formation of joint ventures.1 1
For instance, it is to a prospective joint venture's benefit that
Mark Crawford, MIT's Vest Sees Major Challenge to Research, 9 NEw TECH. WK.
50, Dec. 18, 1995, availablein 1999 WL 9015743.
152 See id. at 2.
153 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 261 (stating that "[t]he antitrust laws are remarkably flexible in permitting joint activity ...[and that they] are not a large barrier
to consortia formation").
154See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
151
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courts only generalize regarding the factors they consider in
their rule of reason analysis. A soft standard like this allows businesses to hedge on their creativity when forming ajoint venture.
The flexibility in the balancing of the anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects allows for leniency in which efficiency
achieving processes will pass rule of reason muster. The adoption of a strict balancing test by the courts would hinder joint
venture formation.
Once again, one may point to other proposed solutions that
would alleviate our ostensibly deficient recent R&D effort. The
most basic of these solutions is for the federal government to
increase its amount of funding for R&D and production efforts.
If the claim is that America simply is not spending enough, an
increase in R&D spending is the most obvious solution. Alternatively, if one believes that foreign companies are indeed pirating
American ideas with their investment in American companies,
we should limit the amount of foreign direct investment in
American R&D efforts. Indeed, this is the solution if foreign
companies are merely "skeleton operations designed to monitor
and pirate American ideas."' 55 Influential proponents of a restriction in foreign direct investment in American R&D efforts
include Clyde Prestowitz, former member of the Reagan administration's Department of Commerce and current president of
156
the Economic Strategy Institute in Washington.
But restricting foreign investment will actually deteriorate the
quality of American R&D. In light of the decreased level of federal funding and private sponsorship of American R&D, foreign
investment enhances our science and technology.'
Foreign
owned laboratories produce patents at a greater rate than domestically owned ones.' 58 Foreign investment also leads to in1 59
creased numbers of reported findings in technology journals.
Therefore, a restriction of foreign investment would cut off a
valuable source of American R&D investment and positive innovative externalities. Noting, then, how beneficial foreign investment is, America should take notice and increase its amount of
investment abroad. "Cases of technology being imported from
16
[abroad] are virtually non-existent.""
155 See
156 See
157 See
158

Florida, supra note 132, at 34.

id.

id.
See id. (to be sure, foreign labs tend to focus on patent intensive activities).

159 See id.
10o Kinoshita,

supra note 141, at 2.
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Solutions closer to home include an increase in the number
of public or private consortia and management/technology extension centers. Consortia of technology businesses enjoy the
same benefits as joint R&D and production ventures regarding
61
the elimination of the duplication of effort, shared risks, etc.
Consortia have the potential to help America compete in all industries, especially high technology. 162 As one example of a government sponsored consortium, Sematech163 has made the
semiconductor industry more efficient and has led to American
companies' further increasing their market share.164 With the
goal of bringing semiconductor dominance back to the United
States, several past and present affiliates of the consortium have
increased efficiencies dramatically. For example, ATEQ introduced its laser mask writer a year sooner than expected, LAM
Research decreased development costs by 35%, GCA Corp. increased the mean time between failure of one of its products
more than fivefold, and NCR claims that Sematech helped it introduce manufacturing technology 9 to 12 months earlier than
expected. 165 Robert Galvin, the former chairman and vice-chairman of the Sematech board, stated that "if Sematech had not
that
been created ...some American semiconductor producers
'1 66
today.
business
of
out
be
would
thriving
now
are

In addition to technology consortia, America should increase
its number of management and technology extension centers.
These centers, which are modeled after the "highly successful
agricultural extension centers, [are to apply] the latest manufacSee Piraino, supra note 80, at 886-887.
See Earl, supra note 143, at 778.
163 The Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium consists of the
federal government and eleven semiconductor manufacturers. See generally, Welcome to Sematch and International SEMATECH (visited Aug. 29, 1999) <http://
www.sematech.org/public/home.htm>.
164 See Earl, supra note 143, at 780-82.
165 See id. at 780 (citing Peter Burrows, Bill Spencer Struggles to Reform Sematech,
ELECTRONIC Bus., May 18, 1992, at 57, 60). LAM Research, ATEQ and GCA
Corp. are equipment suppliers with which Sematech has entered into joint development arrangements for performance of specific projects. See e-mail from Bob
Falstad, General Counsel and Secretary, Sematech, to Rob Pivnick, Special
Projects Editor, SMU Law Review Association (Apr. 27, 1999) (on file with the
SMU Law Review Association). Other members include Intel, AMD, Motorola, Lucent Technologies, and Texas Instruments. See Corporate Information (visited
Aug. 29, 1999) <http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/index.htm#
memberlist>.
166 Daniel Southerland, Sematech's CriticalJuncture:Hailed as Success, Chip Consortium Faces Budget Cuts, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1992, at B1, B2.
161
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turing and production technology."1 6' 7 The few centers that are
in existence do not "advertise for fear of attracting too much
business." 168 The nascent existence of American manufactur-

ing/technology centers allows ample room for growth. The Japanese, for instance, spend over $470 million for 185 technology
centers.1 69 Even this amount is insignificant when compared to
on the Agricultural Extension Servicethat spent domestically
70
$1.2 billion.'

However, in light of a lack of capital, large trade deficit, and
unfavorable tax laws, many of these proposed solutions are
more easily said than done. To encourage American R&D investment, our government must alter the "unfavorable laws re' 71
lating to depreciation schedules and credits for investment.'
As one comparative example, "[t]heJapanese are able to depreciate their high technology equipment investments in three
years as opposed to five years for American companies. This
makes investment much cheaper and therefore more attractive
to Japanese companies."1172 Additionally, since technology is so

dynamic, a three year depreciation schedule more accurately reflects the reality of the market. 173 An additional change should
be made to the R&D tax credit. These minor changes should
suffice to influence companies to increase their amount of investment in R&D projects.
X.

CONCLUSION

One can point to any number of possible causes to America's
purported lack of innovation. But the most oft cited cause, our
antitrust laws, is merely a scapegoat for whatever the actual
cause might be. Likewise, one can list innumerable solutions
that might solve the problem. And while many of them appear
like a proper response, none is the answer. Instead of the speculation that accompanies our purported deficient level of innovation, America must identify the real source of our suspect R&D
and production technology.
167

Earl, supra note 143, at 783.
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[64

However, until it is proven that there is indeed a problem, the
status quo need not be changed. Indeed, before identifying a
cause or solution, one must identify a problem. To quote a
timely adage: If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
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